Campbell Brown is right that my argument against semi-global consequentialism relies on the principle of agglomeration. However, semi-global consequentialists cannot rescue their view simply by rejecting this principle.
Combined 'oughts' imply 'can': It can only be the case that an agent ought to bring about P and that this agent ought to bring about Q if this agent can bring about both P and Q. 6 The principle that combined 'oughts' imply 'can' can be true even if the principle of agglomeration is false. And claims (1) and (2) are together inconsistent with the principle that combined 'oughts' imply 'can'. Therefore, to rescue their view, semi-global consequentialists not only have to reject the principle of agglomeration, but also have to reject the principle that combined 'oughts' imply 'can'.
That makes semi-global consequentialism very implausible. To see this, consider first a situation in which the following claims are true:
Fred can bring about R, and it would produce some good if he did this.
(5) Fred can bring about S, and it would produce slightly more good if he did this.
(6) Fred can bring about both R and S. Now consider a situation in which the following claims are true:
(10) Susan can go to work today, and it would produce some good if she did this.
(11) Susan can read a philosophy book today, and it would produce some good if she did this.
(12) Susan can go shopping today, and it would produce some good if she did this.
(13) Susan can collect money for Oxfam today, and it would produce some good if she did this.
(14) Susan can only do one of these things today.
According to semi-global consequentialism, everything that maximizes the good and that agents can bring about is right. Therefore, given the claim about maximization that consequentialists accept, and given how consequentialism uses the term 'right', semi-global consequentialism has to claim:
(15) Susan ought to go to work today.
(16) Susan ought to read a philosophy book today.
(17) Susan ought to go shopping today.
(18) Susan ought to collect money for Oxfam today.
But surely, if a semi-global consequentialist made all of these claims, Susan could say:
"I can only do one of these things today. Therefore, I have to choose between them.
8 It may be thought that consequentialists instead accept something like the following claim: a thing would maximize the good if and only if this thing is part of a set of things that, of the sets of things that agents can bring about, would produce most good. However, if that were so, semi-global consequentialism would be equivalent to semi-global combination consequentialism (see below).
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And if that view is true, either claim (1) or claim (2) 
